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INTRODUCTION 
The theory of causal attribution has its foundations in 
naive psychology (Heider, 1958), an attempt to explain human 
behavior from the layman's point of view. Basic to this ap-
proach is the assumption that all men attempt an understanding 
of human nature and that personal theories have a definite in-
fluence on subsequent behavior. 
Attribution theory 
Heider noted that an integral aspect of common sense 
psychology is the attribution of causality. The exact meaning 
of a particular behavior, as well as the appropriate response to 
it, is often uncertain. Knowledge of the determinants of the be-
havior can, however, aid in its interpretation. For instance, a 
behavior such as tardiness, may take on very different meanings 
depending upon whether it happened intentionally or accidentally. 
Heider (1958) outlined an approach to the study of causal 
perception. The formal theories of attribution (Jones & Davis, 
1965; Kelley, 1967) developed from the ideas of Heider's outline. 
First to appear was Jones and Davis' theory of correspondent in-
ferences. Theirs is a theory of how humans perceive specific 
intentions or attributes from observations of specific actions. A 
2 
second, though complementary theory, was proposed by Kelley 
(1967) which can be referred to as the theory of external attribution. 
Basic to Kelley 1s theory is his concern with the differentiation of 
environmental from personal causality. 
According to Jones and Davis, the perceiver attempts to 
label an attribute which has the highest correspondence to a given 
effect. Correspondence, for a particular attribute effect linkage, 
appears to increase as the attribute in question departs from the 
norm of social desirability. In other words, an attribute effect 
linkage which deviates from the norm has a greater probability of 
reflecting the actor 1s true intention. 
Correspondence is also achieved through the examination of 
noncommon effects. Correspondence refers to the examination of 
the alternative actions which would have produced a different effect 
than that which occurred, This procedure may provide the per-
ceiver with clues regarding the actor 1s exact goals or intentions. 
Personal involvement of the perceiver with the effect also 
is assumed to influence the attribution process. Two levels of in-
volvement have been distinguished, hedonic relevance and personal-
ism. If an eff.ect either promotes or interferes with the perceiver 1 s 
goals it is said to be hedonically relevant. If the perceiver judges 
that he himself is the object of the action then a condition of personal-
ism results. Correspondence is said to increase in direct proportion 
to increases in personal involvement. 
Kelley (1967, 1971, 1972, 1973) has approached this problem 
area from perhaps a wider perspective, considering not just an 
analysis of intentions but also the environmental and circumstantial 
determinants of behavior. This approach rests on the observation 
that persons are often seen as being determined by factors external 
to themselves. Particular then, to Kelley's approach is the problem 
of external versus internal causality. 
Kelley's analysis describes two cases which may exist for 
an observer faced with the problem of attributing causality. In 
the first case the observer has information from multiple obs erva-
tions. In these cases the attributor must rely on what Kelley calls 
covariation concepts. In the second case the observe.r has informa-
tion from only a single observation. In these cases he must rely 
on the configuration of possible causes in order to gain insight into 
the determining factors. 
Formally stated, the principle of covariation asserts, "An 
effect is attributed to the one of its possible causes with which, 
over time it covaries" (Kelley, 1973, p. 108). Kelley uses an 
analysis of variance analogy to describe how such a principle 
operates in the observer. This model represents a three-way 
analysis of entities and persons over time. For example, if a 
behavior is seen to covary over time and entities for a particular 
individual, then attributions will tend to be personal. On the other 
hand, if a behavior is seen to covary over time across a number 
of persons then an environmental inference is the more likely 
cause. 
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Such an analysis can also be described in terms of three 
factors: the distinctive association of the response to the stim-
ulus, the consensus of other persons' responses, and the con-
sistency of the response over time and modalities. These factors, 
alone or in combination, produce information leading to distinc-
tive types of attributive outcomes. For example, high distinct-
iveness inclines one to make an entity attribution, whereas low 
consensus leads to personal attributions. 
In cases where only a single observation is made the attrib-
utor must rely on the availability of other sorts of information. 
Such information may concern the plausibility of other causes, The 
discounting principle represents the use of such information. Form-
ally stated, the role of a given cause in producing a given effect is 
discounted if other plausible causes are also present. The dis-
counting principle is an example of the configuration concept men-
tioned above. Another configuration concept is the augmentation 
principle. This principle refers to cases where an action takes 
place though inhibitory factors are present. Under this configura-
tion, if an action took place in the presence of a strong external in-
hibitor, the attributions to the person would be augmented. 
The use of these configuration concepts implies what Kelley 
calls causal schemata. A causal schema represents the assumed 
pattern of data regarding the possible causes in terms of a given 
effect and is an ext ens ion of the analysis of variance analogy. Each 
, 
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configuration implies its corresponding schema. The discounting 
principle implies a multiple sufficient schema, while the augmenta-
tion principle implies the compensatory schema. A third case is 
I 
the multiple necessary schema. Under these conditions, both in-
. :I 
I I 
ternal and external causes must be present in order for the given 
effect to occur. 
The actor and observer bias in causal attribution 
Until recently the formal theories of attribution have ne-
glected consideration of the actor and observer biases with regard 
to the perception of causality. Heider (1958) first observed that 
actors and observers tend to perceive the determinants of an action 
,i'' differently. Observers tend to attribute personal responsibility to 
the actor for his performance while actors tend to perceive their 
own behavior as a response determined by the particular situation. 
Some evidence in support of the proposition has been gather-
ed by researchers studying other aspects of attribution theory (Jones 
& Harris, 1967; Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals & Ward, 1968; 
Jones, Worchel & Grumet, 1971; McArthur, 1972). These re-
I j searchers report that there is a tendency for observers to take the behavior of an actor at face value as indicative of his true intentions 
or dispositions. This tendency appeared to be one of the most potent 
determinants of the attribution process in these studies. Observers 
in the Jones and Harris (1967) study listened to pro Castro and anti 
Castro speeches by students supposedly on the college debate team. 
I:Jalf of the observers were under the impression that the students 
were given no freedom in chaos ing the position of their talk 
while the other half of the observers were told that the students 
were given this freedom of choice. Regardless of the choice 
condition observers tended to assume that the communicators 
held the position espoused. The fact that a communicator was 
under heavy external pressure to perform in a particular way 
apparently had little effect on the observers tendency to make dis-
positional attributions. Recently, this same study was replicated 
by Jones, Worchel, Goethals and Grumet (1971), using the legal-
ization of marijuana as the debate topic. Essentially the same re-
sults were obtained. 
Attributions were made by both actor subjects and observer 
subjects in the Jones, Rock, Shaver, Goethals and Ward (1968) 
study. The experimenters provided their subjects with false feed-
back regarding the results of a rigged I. Q. test. Then they were 
asked whether the performance was due to item difficulty, a situa-
tional factor or the ability of the test taker, a dispositional factor. 
Actor subjects and observer subjects differed markedly in their 
attributions. Actor subjects tended to attribute changes in per-
formance to changes in item difficulty. Observers, however, at-
tributed changes in performance to variations in the ability of the 
performer. 
McArthur (1972) attempted a lengthy study designed to test 
the accuracy of Kelley's notions concerning the effects of distinct-
iveness, consistency and consensus information in causal attribution. 
6 
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Subjects were presented with short sentences which described the 
behavior of a hypothetical actor in terms of the above three factors. 
Although the experimental and control groups did differ in their 
attributions, the most frequent response for either group was a 
dispositional attribution. I, , 
More direct tests of this phenomenon have been attempted 
in an additional study by McArthur (1972) as well as studies by 
Nisbett, Caputo, Legant and Marecek (1971) and by Storms (1973). 
McArthur's research involved asking actor subjects why they con-
sented to participate in a survey and then comparing their responses 
with those of observers who received a written report of the actor's .: II 
;1 II 
behavior. As expected, actors thought that their behavior was due i 
:II 
to the importance of the survey while the observers seemed to 
think that the actors' behavior was due to their predisposition to 
participate in surveys. 
Nisbett, Caputo, Legant and Maracek (1971) conducted a 
series of experiments dealing directly with the bias. Their first 
effort was similar in design to McArthur's second experiment in 
that actors were induced to volunteer for a project while both 
actors and observers made causal attributions. The experiment 
differed from McArthur's in that the observers were actually 
present at the time of the performance. As expected, the observers 
assumed that the actors would behave in a similar manner on future 
occasions. This was interpreted as a dispositional attribution. 
8 
Actors themselves, however, did not share in this assumption, 
believing instead that their behavior was limited to that particular 
situation. In a second study, the researchers asked their subjects 
to describe the reasons for their own and their best friend's choices 
of a girl friend and college major. Subjects were found to describe 
their own choices as resulting from the unique qualities of the choice 
object. On the other hand, descriptions of the reasons for the best 
friend's choices reflected the unique dispositional properties of the 
friend. A third study required subjects to describe a stimulus per-
son in trait or situational terms. The stimulus persons used were 
the subject himself, a best friend, his father, an admired acquaint-
ance and the television commentator Walter Cronkite. The results 
indicated that subjects used a significantly greater number of trait 
adjectives while describing another than when describing them-
selves. 
A final study, to be described in greater detail in another 
section, lends still more evidence to this proposition that actors 
and observers perceive the cause of behavior differently. An 
experiment conducted by Storms (1973) required previously un-
acquainted actor subjects to converse with each other for a brief 
time. Observer subjects were also present. Essentially no other 
manipulations took place for several conditions of this experiment. 
In these conditions, actors demonstrated a strong tendency to 
attribute their behavior to factors related to the situation. Con-
vers ely, observers tended to make attributions in terms of the 
actor's disposition. 
Theoretical considerations 
In view of the abundance of evidence, Jones and Nisbett 
(1971) have attempted a thorough theoretical treatment of this 
phenomenon. This difference between actor's and observer's 
perceptions of causality was thought to stem from possible differ-
ences in the information available to the actor and observer con-
cerning the actor's behavior and also from possible differences in 
the way the present behavioral data is perceived. 
Obviously the observer lacks much information which may 
be useful in the determination of causality. This information 
would consist of knowledge of the actor's subjective experience 
concerning his emotions and intentions and his perceptions of the 
situation. The observer may also lack knowledge of how the actor 
has performed in the past. Jones and Nisbett (1972) have proposed 
that this difference in the knowledge of the actor's past behavior 
may, in part, account for the observer's tendency to rely on the 
actor's present behavior in determining causality. This historical 
data concerning the actor's behavior represents what Kelley (1967) 
has labeled as consistency data. Consistency data represents one 
of the clues in determining personal or situational causality. If a 
person responds consistently in a certain manner across a wide 
variety of situations, then an inference of personal causality tends 
9 
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to be made. On the other hand, if the actor responds inconsistently, 
then there is reason to conclude that his behavior depends upon the 
situation. The research of McArthur (1972) appears to confirm 
the above proposition. Subjects were presented with short descrip-
tions of an actor's behavior. Distinctiveness, consensus and con-
sistency information were included in the descriptions with the 
various levels of these factors varied across descriptions. Con-
sistency information proved to be a powerful factor leading to greater 
personal attributions when consistency was high and a greater number 
of situational attributions when consistency was low. 
Since observers often lack consistency type information about 
the actor, they are forced to weigh what other information they i 
'! 
possess more heavily. This lack of information would lead one to 
expect a tendency for the observer to take the present behavior at 
face value. On the other hand, the actor is liable to recall at least 
several instances when he responded differently in a similar situa-
tion. This additional information might predispose the actor to 
treat his present behavior as less indicative of his true disposition 
than would an observer. 
A second possible explanation for the actor and observer 
differences in attributions may be found in the divergence of per-
spectives from which they view the behavioral sequence. Jones 
and Nisbett have observed that the first person or actor point of 
view is one in which the focus of attention is primarily directed 
11 
upon the environmental situation rather than upon the behavior 
itself. It is thought that this perspective is due, at least in part, 
to the outward orientation of one's sensory apparatus. Thus the 
orientation of the actor is such that he attends to and utilizes the 
information concerning the situation more than that of his own be-
havior. 
On the other hand, the observer's orientation is better 
suited to view the behavior of the actor since the actor is a part of 
the observer's environment. There is a tendency, then, for the 
observer to attend to and utilize more of the information concerning 
the actor's behavior than the actor does himself. 
These divergent perspectives for actors and observers 
which lead to differences in the attention to and the utilization of 
data could conceivably account for their apparent disagreement con-
cerning the attribution of causality. 
Support for this hypothesis is found in the study (Storms, 
1973) in which perspective was manipulated through an alteration 
of the subjects 1 visual orientation towards a behavioral sequence. 
After viewing the behavioral sequence in vivo, a number of actors 
and observers reviewed the incident through the use of videotape. 
For half of these subjects, both actors and observers, a reorienta-
tion of perspective took place. This was accomplished by showing I, 
'< 
the subjects a videotape taken from a camera angle which differed 
from their original angle of view. For observers, the change in 
perspective was from the third person point of view. For actors, 
the change was from the first person to the third. The remaining 
subjects in this experiment either re-experienced the behavior 
from their original point of view or received no videotape exposure 
at all. This study revealed that actors who viewed their own be-
havior from the third person (observer) perspective would tend to 
reverse the actor bias and make predominantly dispositional at-
tributions. Likewise, observers who viewed the actor's behavior 
from the first person (actor) perspective were found to perceive 
the situation as the cause of the behavior. Thus, it appears as 
though visual perspective differences can account for s orne of the 
actor and observer differences in causal attribution. 
The relative effectiveness of information and perspective 
Consistency information as well as perspective have been 
established as influential in determining perceptions of causality. 
It is not clear, however, which mechanism is the more powerful 
factor or if they interact in s orne way. The degree of emphasis 
to be placed on each of these mechanisms has been a point of 
theoretical disagreement. Heider, it appears, emphasized the 
effects of information while Jones and Nisbett emphasize perspec-
tive. A determination of the more influential factor would appear 
necessary in attempting to draw a conclusion regarding the general-
ity of the phenomenon. Perspective differences between actors and 
observers are relatively invariant. If perspective is the more 
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crucial factor, then one would expect a persistence of the actor 
and observer disagreement across various degrees of familiar-
ity, similarity or any other factor which might tend to increase 
the amount of information shared by the actor and observer. If, 
on the other hand, perspective is a relatively weak mechanism 
operating effectively only when other information is lacking, 
then one may discount the all per vas ivenes s of the phenomenon 
under conditions where a real effort has been made to supply the 
observer with the necessary information. 
Jones and Nisbett's emphasis upon perspective may be 
due to the persistence of the observer bias in such studies (i.e. 
Jones and Harris, 1967; McArthur, 1972) where compelling situa-
tional information was supplied. However, there is some evidence 
that the degree of acquaintance, and hence knowledge of the actor's 
past behavior, may attenuate the effects of perspective. This evi-
dence comes from the third study reported by Nisbett et. al. (1971). 
They observed that within a specific category of acquaintance, greater 
familiarity with the stimulus person decreased the tendency to assign 
traits, This evidence, however, is only correlational and may re-
fleet other factors than just knowledge of the actor's past. 
The relative effectiveness of these two factors could be 
measured in an experiment which would simultaneously manipulate 
perspective and the presence or absenc'e of consistency type informa-
tion. However, on the basis of the available evidence, spe-
cific hypotheses seem unwarranted. A number of possible outcomes 
13 
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coul.d result. If perspective was the overhwelmingly potent 
mechanism, then the presence or absence of either consistent 
or inconsistent information shoul.d have negligible effects. If 
perspective was only important when other information is lack-
ing, then one should observe strong perspective effects under an 
absence of information condition and small perspective effects 
when either consistent or inconsistent information is provided. 
If, however, both perspective and information are equally im-
portant, then uniformly significant results should be obtained with 
no interactions. 
,:l!i 
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METHOD 
Overview 
This experiment consisted of a manipulation of both per-
spective and information in a two by three factorial design with 
subjects randomized across conditions. The manipulation of 
perspective varied from the first person to the third person 
point of view. Consistent, inconsistent and consistency irrele-
vant information was presented in a three-way manipulation of 
this variable. These manipulations were carried out in terms of 
a videotape which depicted the behavior of a principle character 
along a dimension of generosity. The tape consisted of two sections. 
The first section provided the manipulation of consistency. The 
second section consisted of the critical behavioral sequence for 
which the attributions were to be made. 
First, a series of four scenes took place in which a history 
of behavior relevant to generosity was formed. In the consistent 
condition, aU four scenes represented instances of generous be-
havior. Inconsistency of behavior was conveyed by having the 
actor behave in a non-generous fashion in the first and fourth scenes 
while behaving in a generous fashion in the remaining two. A third 
condition where consistency type information was lacking altogether 
was produced by padding the four scenes with material which was 
unrelated to the behavior in question. 
In the original design of this experiment, the manipulation 
15 
of perspective was to have taken place in this first section as 
well as in the second. This would have consisted of presenting 
the four prior scenes as well as the final one from the actor and 
observer points of view. After the initiation of the experiment, 
but before the final data were collected and analyzed, it became 
apparent to the experimenter that this method would introduce the 
possibility of several alternative yet plausible hypotheses in re-
gard to the effects of consistency. The correct isolation of the 
consistency variable necessitates that the history be presented in 
an identical manner across levels of perspective. A simultaneous 
manipulation of the two variables might cause them to interact 
in such a way as to alter the subject•s perception of the informa-
tion variable. Thus, it would not be possible to make clear com-
parisons of the effects of perspective across similar levels of in-
formation. 
An alternative design pres en ted the manipulation of the 
perspective variable only during the final scene of the tape. In 
this final scene the principle actor engaged in an extended example 
of generous behavior. The subjects were required to make their 
attributional responses in regards to this scene. 
The videotape 
The total film consisted of five short scenes, the first 
four lasting about thirty seconds each, the final one taking almost 
two minutes. The film appears to follow a typical Loyola University 
student through some typical casual campus encounters. In the 
16 
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initial scene the actor approached a male student attempting to 
make a telephone call. In both the consistent and inconsistent 
conditions the phone caller requested a dime from the actor, The 
actor either complied (consistent) or refused (inconsistent). In 
the consistency irrelevant condition the phone caller made no re-
quests of the actor. The second scene did not vary between con-
ditions of consistency and depicted the actor in conversation with 
a couple of friends who ultimately ask him if he would drop a book 
off at the library. The actor then agreed to do the favor. In the 
condition of irrelevant information no request of the actor was 
made. The third scene depicted the actor providing a fellow male 
student with directions. This scene also did not vary across con-
ditions relevant to consistency but in the condition of irrelevant 
information the actor only passed the student at the entrance to an 
escalator. In the fourth scene a young co-ed accidently dropped her 
books near the actor. The actor either assisted (consistent) or ig-
nored her (inconsistent). In the irrelevant information condition 
the girl just passed by. 
The final scene depicted the behavior upon which the at-
tributions were made. The actor 1 s behavior was constant through-
out all three conditions of information. The episode began as the 
actor approached an attractive young co-ed stranded along the road 
with a flat tire. She petitioned the actor for aid and in all cases 
he obliged. 
Taken individually, these five scenes were presented in 
I 
I 
such a manner as to appear ambiguous with respect to the dispo-
sitional and situational characteristics of the actor's behavior, It 
was anticipated that this ambiguity would aid in the proper function-
ing of the manipulations. 
Subjects 
One hundred eighteen male and female Loyola University 
undergraduate students participated in this experiment as part 
of their laboratory requirement for an introductory psychology 
course. 
Procedure 
A videotape monitor was set up in a large room adequate 
to accommodate half of the required subjects for each condition. 
The experimenter instructed the subjects in the following manner: 
This experiment consists of the viewing of a 
short film, about four minutes in length, which 
follows a typical Loyola student during his every-
day travels through campus, Your job, as partic-
ipants in this experiment, is to be as attentive as 
possible while watching this film. Afterward, you 
will be asked to answer a few questions concerning 
the content of this film. 
The tape was then shown. Immediately afterwards the dependent 
measures were distributed, 
Dependent measures 
The subjects were presented with a series of questions pre-
ceded by a page of instructions, The instructions were as follows: 
The following section of this questionnaire 
concerns your impressions of the principal 
character's behavior during the final scene of 
the film. You will be asked to describe his 
18 
behavior along a standard dimension of gener-
osity. Then you are to indicate how much in-
fluence each of the following two factors had in 
causing him to behave in the way he did. The 
first of these two factors is the Personal Char-
acteristics about the student. For example, his 
personality traits, character, personal style, at-
titudes, mood, and so on. The second factor is 
the Characteristics of the Situation. For example, 
such factors might be the location of the incident; 
the nature of the other persons involved, how these 
other persons behaved, the presence of observers, 
as well as any other unique aspects of the circum-
stance. 
Each of these questions is followed by a nine 
step scale. The ends of the scales are labelled 
with extreme and opposite adjectives. The numbers 
toward the middle of the scale represent the various 
degrees intervening between the two adjectives. You 
are to circle the number which best fits your im-
pression of the actor's behavior. 
The dependent measures followed closely those utilized 
by Storms (1973). This was done in order to increase the compar-
ability of the two experiments. The first and fourth questions 
comprised the Present Behavior-General Behavior (PB-GB) 
Index. This is an indirect measure of the degree to which the 
subjects thought the principal character's behavior was due to the 
situation. The first question measured the subjects' perception 
of the actor's level of generous behavior in the final scene (present 
behavior). The fourth question determined the actor's general 
level of generosity. The scores from these two measures were then 
19 
subtracted and the absolute difference indicated the degree of situational 
attribution. An absolute difference was used since any deviation of 
present behavior from general behavior was indicative of situational 
determination. These two questions were phrased as follows: 
I 
,, 
I 
To what extent, in the final scene, did the 
student behave in a generous manner? 
l----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
very 
self-seeking 
very 
generous 
How generous a person do you feel this student 
is in general? 
l----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
very 
self-seeking 
very 
generous 
The second and third questions comprized the key de-
pendent measure of attribution. The second question measured 
the degree of dispositional attribution. The third measured the 
degree of situational att''ribution. The situational scores for each 
subject was then subtracted from his dispositional scores to pro-
duce the Dispositional-Situational (D-S) Index. A positive score 
on this index indicates a dispositional attribution while a negative 
score indicates a situational attribution. These questions were 
as follows: 
How important was the student's personal 
character is tics in determining his behavior during 
the final scene? 
l----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
very 
unimportant 
very 
important 
How important were the characteristics of the 
situation found in the final scene in determining 
his behavior in the final scene? 
l----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
very 
unimportant 
very 
important 
20 
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A few filler items followed before the measurement of 
the degree of consistency perceived to exist between the prior and 
final scenes. The question was as follows: 
Did you find the behavior of the actor in the 
final scene consistent with his behavior prior 
to this scene? 
l----2----3----4----5----6----7----8----9 
very 
inconsistent 
very 
cons is tent 
21 
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RESULTS 
Manipulation check 
Before examining the effects of the experimental vari-
ables on attribution scores a consideration of their effectiveness 
as manipulations is in order. Since the manipulation of perspective 
represented a rather straightforward mechanical procedure manip-
ulation checks were not deemed necessary. 
The manipulation check for the information factor consisted 
of a question which dealt with the degree to which the actor's prior 
behavior was felt to be cons is tent or inconsistent with his behavior 
during the critical scene. The relevant data for this measure are 
presented in Table 1. 
Perspective 
of Final-Scene 
First 
Person 
Third 
Person 
TABLE 1. 
Consistency Means 
Information 
Consistent Inconsistent Irrelevant 
7. 16 ab 5.77bc 6. 16b 
8.05 4. 50 6. 05b 
a c 
Those cells not sharing the same subscript differ 
at the . 05 level. The higher mean indicate a 
greater perception of consistency. 
r 
'I 
d 
The analysis of variance indicated a significant main 
effect in the predicted direction for the information factor 
("!:_'=10. 80, df=2/102, E< . 01,) with no interactions. Comparisons 
of conditions, using the Duncan's Multiple Range Test, reveal 
that significant differences did exist between conditions of con-
sistent and inconsistent inforn1ation. This difference, however, 
only reached the. 10 level in the comparison of consistency levels 
within the first person perspective. All other comparisons be-
tween consistent and inconsistent conditions did reach significance 
at the. 01 level. Within the third person perspective, all compari-
sons of inconsistent and consistent conditions with conditions of 
irrelevant information differed at significant levels (E.;(. . 05 ). 
Significant differences of this sort were not found within the first 
person perspective. In addition, within the level of inconsistent in-
formation, differences were indicated between levels of perspective, 
23 
though only at the . 10 level. It would appear as though the manipula-
tion rnet the rninimum standards of effectiveness. However, note 
should be taken of the fact that a much weaker effect occurred under 
the first person perspective. 
The dis pos iiion<l:l- s iLuational index 
The D-S index represented the rnajor dependent variable 
in the study. Table 2 presents the data for this measure. An 
analysis of variance indicated that a main effect occurred under 
the inforrnation variable (-!::'=8. 48, df=2 /102, E.< . 01). A main effect 
did not occur for the perspective variable (~=1, df=l/102, n. s.) Thus 
it would appear that the inforrnation variable was the more crucial 
r 
factor in detert--nlning attributions. 
TABLE 2. 
Attribution means for the D-S Index 
Information 
Perspective 
of Final Scene 
First 
Person 
Third 
Person 
Cons is tent Inconsistent Irrelevant 
0 -1. 94 -. 388 
abc b abc 
l. 50 -1. 94 -. 722 
a b be 
Those cells not sharing the same subscript differ at the 
. 05 level. The more positive the means the greater the 
attribution to the person. 
An examination of individual comparisons using the Dun-
can•s Test indicates that subjects from both perspective conditions 
who received consistent inforrnation concerning the actor's be-
havior made more dispositional attributions than either groups 
receiving inconsistent information. Although these differences 
are significant at the . 01 level for the third person perspective 
comparisons, they are only significant at the . 10 level for subjects 
receiving the first person perspective. In addition, the presence 
of consistent information had some effect in inflating dispositional 
attributions over those that occurred when irrelevant information 
was presented. This, however, was only noticed for subjects 
viewing the tape under the third person perspective (E.< . 05 ). 
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-I Although the main effects of perspective are negligible, a 
significant interaction did occur between information and the point 
of view (F=3. 90, d£=2/102, .E.<. . 05) as seen in Figure l (P. 26). 
In this interaction, the only notable difference in attributions with-
in levels of information but across levels of perspective occurs 
under tbe consistency condition. Apparently, the first person 
perspective interacted in son"le way with the consistency informa-
I 
tion to depress dispositional scores. The difference between at- I. 
I' 
tributions at this point is at best only marginally significant at the I 
. 10 level. 
The present behavior;..general behavior index 
The PB-GB index measures the degree to which the actor's 
behavior was felt to deviate from his behavior in general. High 
scores on this index indicate greater deviation and hence greater 
situational attribution than low scores. Table 3 contains the data 
for this index. Consistent with the analysis for the D-S index, a 
significant main effect for information was obtained (F=5. 69, 
df=2/l02, .E.<.. 05). However, the PB-GB measure showed a slight 
effect for perspective (F=3. 39, df=l/102, .E.< . 10). Unlike the case 
with the D-S measure, a significant interaction was not found. The 
analysis of individual comparisons indicates that these main effects 
can be predominately attributed to the extremely high situational 
scores found in tbe condition of the first person perspectivc-incon-
sistent information. This cell significantly differed from all others 
at the. 05 level using the Duncan's Multiple Range Test. 
. 20 
Dispositional 
. 10 
0 
10 
Situational 
-.20 
FIGURE I 
0 
' 
' 
' 
Cons is tent 
' 
' 
' 
' 
' 
lst person 
perspective 
3rd person 
perspective 
Inc on sis tent Irrelevant 
INFORMATION 
Attribution means of first and third perspectives 
across levels of information for the D-S Index. 
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TABLE 3. 
Attribution means for the PB-GB Index 
Inforrnation 
Perspective 
of Final Scene 
First 
Person 
Third 
Person 
Consistent Inconsistent Irrelevant 
1. oob l. 88 . 94b a 
. 72 
b 
l. 27 
b . 77b 
Those cells not sharing the sam.e subscript differ 
at the . 05 level. The higher mean indicate greater 
attributions to the person. 
27 
28 
DISCUSSION 
Summary of results 
The manipulation of consistency type information appears 
to have been a valid one in that the manipulation check, consisting 
of consistency ratings yielded significant differences between 
levels of this factor. The manipulation of perspective, consisting 
of a rather straightforward mechanical procedure, should also be 
considered valid. 
Considering this evidence of internal validity one may then 
state that in this present effort, prior information rather than per-
spective appears to be the factor which determined attributions of 
causality. This conclusion is based upon data from two measures of 
attributions, each indicating a main effect for information and only 
marginal effects for perspective. These marginal effects for per-
spective consisting of the significant interaction obtained with the 
D-S index and the slight main effect indicated with the PB- GB index. 
Questions of external validity - a comparison with Kelley and Storms 
The external validity of this study should be considered. The 
influences of prior information are basically in agreement with those 
predicted from Kelley's theory of attribution (Kelley, 1967). Over-
all, consistent information produced somewhat higher dispositional 
ratings than did inconsistent information, which tended to influence 
a situational rating. Individual comparisons, however, were not con-
sistently significant in this regard. For instance, in the analysis of 
l 
f 
i 
I 
I j 
I 
I 
I 
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the PB-GB measure, the comparison between levels of information 
within the third person perspective failed to reach significance 
even at a . 10 level. In addition, conditions where consistent or in-
consistent information was presented often failed to differ from 
those conditions where consistency irrelevant information was 
presented. This is especially evident in the analysis of the PB-GB 
measure where attribution totals for groups who received consistent 
prior information were identical with those who received irrelevant 
information. It is also evidenced in the analysis of the D-S index 
where comparisons of irrelevant information conditions failed to 
differ significantly from those groups receiving either condition of 
inconsistent information along with first person perspective and 
those groups receiving inconsistent information with the third per-
son perspective. These observations may be indicative of the limits 
of effect on information to influence attribution. However, it is also 
plausible to suppose that a ceiling effect was reached under the ex-
treme levels of information. Differences in the intermediate range 
would then be insignificant. 
The data from this study should also be examined with re-
spect to the research of Storms (1973). In that experiment an ex-
tremely potent effect was obtained from the manipulation of per-
spective. Though no manipulation of prior information was attempted 
in the Storms' research, the two experiments are comparable if one 
considers those conditions of the present experiment where con-
s istency irrelevant information was present. It was within these 
conditions that the pure effects for perspective were supposedly 
measured. Neither for the D-S or the PB-GB measure were the 
levels of perspective found to differentially influence attributions 
within this level of information. One possible explanation for this 
finding might be that a threshold effect occurred. In other words, 
the influence of perspective was not in itself strong enough to pro-
duce observable differences in attributions. This factor, however, 
in combination with consistent or inconsistent information surpassed 
the threshold. Thus, the influence of perspective was only observed 
under conditions of consistency relevant information. 
Storms, nevertheless, did observe significant differences 
between levels of perspective. His method differs from that of the 
present experiment in that Storms' subjects experienced a re-
orientation of perspectives. The contrast between the first and 
second orientations may have heightened the saliency of cues pert-
inent to a change in attributions. The fact that a re-orientation 
occurred may prove to be crucial in the attainment of a strong per-
spective effect. 
Conclusions and questions 
Though factors related to information had the greater in-
fluence in the present study, caution must be exercised in drawing 
any general conclusions regarding the determinants of the actor 
and observer bias. The plausibility of Jones and Nisbett's (1972) 
proposal that perspective differences account for the bias remains 
strong. 
30 
I 
I 
' i 
r 31 
I 
I 
I 
Any factor which could account for the bias must possess 
certain qualifications. The levels of this factor must character-
ize a reliable and distinctive difference between actors and ob-
servers. Perspective represents a very parsimonious choice in 
that it represents a rather basic and persistent difference be-
tween actors and observers. The fact that perspective had little 
influence in the present study suggests the possibility that per-
spective differences in vivo may encompass more than just those 
determined by visual orientation. The actor's attention to his 
environment may also be due to certain motivational factors. Cer-
tainly a high degree of environmental surveillance is required for 
survival. A response is adaptive only insofar as it meets the re-
quirements of the situation. Thus there is a possibility that the 
utilization of situational information may be quite different for an 
actor in vivo as compared with an actor simulation with videotape. 
The choice of consistency type information as the deter-
mining factor for the actor and observer bias rests on the assumption 
that actors generally perceive their behavior as less cons is tent 
than do observers. As pointed out by Heider (1958) and Jones and I I 
! 
Nisbett (1972), this may be a reasonable assumption. However, one 
may not assume that such information is present in natural settings 
to the same degree found in the present experiment. Thus one has 
little assurance that consistency type information is such an im-
portant variable outside the experimental laboratory. 
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Additional research concerning the determinants of the 
actor and observer bias is required before any general conclusion 
can be drawn. Such research should be attempted in both labora-
tory as well as in more naturalistic settings. Note should be taken 
regarding what differences exist between the two procedures and 
results. Only then will one be able to correctly estimate the true 
effect of perspective and consistency in person perception . 
..... 
r 
SUMMARY 
Two variables were investigated as relevant to the deter-
mination of the actor and observer bias in causal attribution. 
These two variables, visual perspective and information regard-
ing the consistency of an actor's behavior were simultaneously 
manipulated in a two by three factorial design. Subjects viewed a 
videotape which provided consistent, inconsistent, or consistency 
irrelevant information regarding an actor's tendency to behave in a 
generous manner. In a final scene the actor engaged in an example 
of generous behavior. This scene was either viewed by the sub-
jects from the first person perspective or from the third person 
perspective. The dependent measures of attribution were then 
distributed. Subjects indicated the degree to which the actor's be-
havior was determined by the situation and by his disposition. Con-
sistency type information rather than visual perspective was found 
to have the greater influence in determining causal attributions. 
Subjects receiving information which portrayed the actor as con-
sistently generous felt that his actions were determined by his dis-
position. Conversely, the portrayal of inconsistency with regard 
to generosity led subjects to make situational attributions. Though 
the data was only marginally significant, there was some tendency 
for perspective to affect attributions. Subjects who viewed the s e-
quence from the first person perspective tended to make more 
33 
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situational attributions than did those subjects who viewed the 
sequence from the third person perspective. 
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